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CHINA REEXAMINED: THE WORST OFFENDER
OR A STRONG CONTENDER?
Yang Wang*
CHINA MODERNIZES: THREAT TO THE WEST OR MODEL FOR THE REST?

By

Randall Peerenboom. New York: Oxford University Press. 2007. Pp xvi,
416. $35.
INTRODUCTION

I am confused. I thought I knew China well. After all, I was born in
China and lived there until I left my parents to come to the United States for
college. My memories of nearly twenty years of living in China and the periodic visits since I left are mostly happy. My parents are middle-income
state employees who lived in a government-issued, Soviet-style apartment
for almost their entire adult lives. Recently, like many other middle-class
Chinese families, they bought a small townhouse in a newly developed suburban community and rented out the old apartment in the city to supplement
their income. They no longer ride bicycles to work. Instead they bought a
small, underpowered Toyota for the now-longer daily commute and baby it
like any sixteen-year-old American does her first car. And like many young
Americans, my sixty-year-old father is thinking about getting a bigger car
with more horsepower and perhaps upgrading to a single-family house at
some later time. My mother, on the other hand, seems less enthusiastic
about yet more upgrades and more excited about getting to know her new
neighbors. My parents are optimistic about their future and looking forward
to their retirement. They, and many ordinary Chinese citizens like them,
seem happy.
But almost a decade of living in the United States has exposed me to another China that I hardly recognize. According to the U.S. government, the
Chinese people are living under a repressive authoritarian regime with a
deplorable human rights record.' We Chinese have a government that routinely commits serious abuses against its own citizens, and due to the tight
control the Chinese Communist Party ("CCP") has on state organs and the
military, there is very little that the oppressed masses can do about it.2 Even
*
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the American media, typically skeptical of the U.S. government, join in
condemning China for human rights violations and social and economic
problems, and paint an overwhelmingly negative image of China.3
Thus, like many other Chinese students studying in the United States, I
am torn between the conflicting views. Like my American classmates in law
school, I study and support freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and human
rights. But I also resent the implied suggestion that my fellow Chinese citizens-resilient, content, and optimistic as many of them seem-are ignorant
about their own servitude and must somehow be enlightened and freed. I
struggle to reconcile my two competing perceptions of China: one, acquired
from having grown up there and from having witnessed its transformation,
that China is finally headed in the right direction, despite its earlier missteps, and has much to contribute to the world community; the other,
acquired during my stay here in the United States, that China is a stubborn
authoritarian state with little regard for its own citizens or the established
international order that is headed on a collision course with the United
States and the West. Are we Chinese blissfully blind to our own perils?
Should we fight for human rights, the rule of law, and democracy-and if
so, when and how? Is China the worst offender or a strong contender?
4
These are the questions that Professor Randall Peerenboom sets out to
answer from an American legal scholar's perspective in China Modernizes:
Threat to the West or Model for the Rest. Peerenboom advances three main

arguments in China Modernizes.5 First, to more accurately assess China's
performance in its quest for modernization, one must "plac[e] China within
a broader comparative context" (p. 10). Through a careful analysis of empirical data, Peerenboom observes that China outperforms many other
countries at a similar income level on almost all key indicators of well-being
and human rights, with the sole exception of civil and political rights
(p. 20). Second, the United States employs a double standard towards China
on human rights issues, and this double standard is likely due to the international human rights regime's unjustified bias against nondemocracies and an
undue emphasis on civil and political rights over social and economic rights
(Chapter Five). Third, China may be following the same path as other East

3.

One commentator makes the following observation with respect to social and economic

rights:
China is generally on a mini-negative image roll in the Western media. The current litany emphasizes the modest size of the Chinese economy (less than a quarter of Japan's) as opposed to
its astonishing rapid growth, the suffocating pollution of its cities as opposed to all the wealthenhancing urbanization, and the 800 or 900 million relatively impoverished Chinese in the
country as opposed to the rise of an unprecedented large middle class nearing 300 million in
size (more than the entire population of the United States).
Tom Plate, The U.S. Media's Love/Hate Relationship with China, AsIAMEDIA, Dec. 8, 2004,
http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=1 8198 (last visited Nov. 29, 2007).
4.

Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles.

5. To give a sense of his perspective, Peerenboom describes himself as "a communitarianleaning pragmatist who emphasizes economic development and the elimination of poverty as essential for human dignity." P. ix.
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Asian countries, such as Japan and South Korea-China may eventually
democratize, but not before it has reached a higher income level, and certainly not at the cost of jeopardizing social stability and economic growth
(Chapters Seven through Nine).6
Peerenboom's comparative approach to evaluating China's human rights
record exemplifies what I call the "contender" approach to human rights
enforcement. Conceptualizing the more traditional approach to enforcement
as the "offender" model, this Notice argues that the offender model should
only be used to enforce jus cogens norms and that the overuse of the offender model enables the double standard in the enforcement of human
rights that Peerenboom identifies. Part I first applauds Peerenboom's approach and his conclusion that China compares remarkably well with other
countries in the same income class on most key indicators of human rights.
Part I then develops the key principles of the offender and contender models. Drawing from the analogy between the offender model and the domestic
criminal justice system, Part I concludes by suggesting that the offender
model should be limited to only those well-defined and widely accepted
core human rights, leaving other rights to be examined under the contender
model. Part II shifts the focus to China's main accuser in the human rights
context, the United States. Extending the analogy between the offender
model and the criminal justice system, this Part supplies additional doctrinal
support for Peerenboom's contention that the United States should abandon
its double standard towards China and further suggests that the overbroad
offender model currently used by the international human rights regime may
have caused or exacerbated the problem of selective enforcement.
A few words on the purpose and relevance of this Notice may be in order here. As a Chinese who has spent a third of his life in the United States
and appreciates all the hospitality, generosity, and education he has received
during his stay in this country, I am perhaps among the most proAmerican-and the most receptive to the liberal version of human rights,
rule-of-law, and democracy ideals-of my generation. Yet as will be apparent from this Notice, I also question the desirability and feasibility of
democracy in China in the immediate future, dispute that the liberal conception of human rights should be the universal standard, and remain critical of
the continued hegemony and arrogance practiced by the U.S. government in
international affairs. Thus, although the American political and human rights
hardliners may be quick to dismiss Peerenboom's position as too sympathetic to the Chinese government and accuse him of being an "apologist[]
for dictators,"' I remain skeptical of their cause and approach. I also wonder

6. This Notice focuses on the first two themes of China Modernizes. For recent literature on
China's future as a democratic state, see, for example, KELLEE S. TSAI, CAPITALISM WITHOUT DEMOCRACY (2007), which argues that privatization will not lead to democratization in China, and
WHAT IF CHINA DOESN'T DEMOCRATIZE?

(Edward Friedman & Barrett L. McCormick eds., 2000),

which features a collection of essays by Sinologists on both sides of the debate.
7. Randall Peerenboom, Beyond Universalism and Relativism: The Evolving Debates about
"Values in Asia," 14 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 1(2003).
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whether these hardliners will have an even more difficult time persuading
the Chinese leadership or proving their case to the typical Chinese citizen.

I.

ASSESSING CHINA'S HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE

Far from being a CCP apologist, Peerenboom does not gloss over
China's problems; he spends a good bit of his book detailing the deficiencies in China's human rights record and its legal system.8 But China
Modernizes goes beyond the conventional criticism leveled against China by
human rights activists and the U.S. government. Peerenboom critically analyzes some of these common accusations and argues that while some of
them are justified, others may be exaggerated and unwarranted, especially
when China's performance is compared to similar countries. Sections L.A
and I.B discuss Peerenboom's assessment of China's human rights record in
the stand-alone and comparative contexts respectively. Section I.C proposes
two models, offender and contender, to characterize the dichotomous approaches to China's human rights performance and makes a preliminary
inquiry into the proper balance between the two.
A. Critiquingthe Critics:The Stand-Alone Context
From the start, Peerenboom takes a stance decidedly different from the
prevailing skeptics of China's human rights policy. Instead of simply dismissing China's official statements as government propaganda, he contends
that while these government statements and reports tend to be selective and
biased, they nevertheless present one side of the picture (p. 82). The main
tenets of China's official response to Western criticism on China's human
rights record, Peerenboom argues, are normatively and factually defensible.
For example, the government's position that interpretation and implementation of human rights depends on local circumstances is "unimpeachable as a
descriptive claim and as a legal claim" (p. 85). Its insistence on prioritizing
subsistence and stability over civil and political rights has popular support
among Chinese citizens and among the majority of citizens in other developing countries (pp. 85-86). In addition, its objection to the interference in
its domestic affairs and sovereignty in the name of human rights-often by
countries with severe human rights problems of their own-is not without
foundation and is shared by other countries (pp. 86-90).
As Peerenboom proceeds to examine China's human rights record in detail, he groups his analysis into two broad categories-physical integrity and
civil and political rights (Chapter Three) and social and economic rights
(Chapter Four)-that loosely track the first- and second-generation rights,
respectively, under Karel Vagdk's theory of three generations of human

8.
For example, Peerenboom is particularly critical of the wide gap between China's official
policy and actual practice with respect to the protection of personal-integrity rights and civil and
political rights, pp. 90-126, and China's failing attempt to reform its criminal justice system, pp.

195-204.
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rights. 9 With respect to first-generation human rights, Peerenboom contends
that China does not deserve the dismal rating it consistently receives on
physical integrity (p. 83), although its low score on civil and political rights,
reflected in its placement in the bottom tenth percentile of the World Bank's
voice-and-accountability index, is accurate (p. 83). With respect to secondgeneration human rights, Peerenboom argues that in light of its limited resources, China does relatively well in most areas of social and economic
rights (pp. 158-62): its standard of living has dramatically improved over
the past decades (pp. 129-32), access to health care has broadened (p. 132),
and the illiteracy rate has decreased (p. 133). Moreover, despite China's dramatic increase in wealth, its level of income disparity has remained virtually
constant from 1995 to 2002 (p. 131). The "stunning rise in wealth that has
lifted over 150 million people out of poverty" is remarkable in itself
(p. 129), and even more so in the comparative context: Peerenboom notes
that China outperforms India, another fast-growing, low-income country, on
all measures of social and economic rights, including infant mortality, life
expectancy, and primary-school enrollment (p. 130).
B. Comparing the Comparables:The Broader Comparative Context
The comparison between China and India is one example of the "broader comparative context" Peerenboom advocates in China Modernizes. In this
"broader comparative context," he argues, one should compare China's human rights record primarily with those of countries at a similar income
level.'( Instead of comparing China's human rights record against "idealized
accounts of good governance and rule of law that no country lives up to, or
the normatively inspiring yet frequently violated idealistic standards championed by human rights activists"-which, as Peerenboom puts it, is akin to
"compar[ing] apples and oranges"-China Modernizes focuses on "demonstrat[ing] how China does relative to the actual performance of other
countries" (p. 10). Peerenboom argues that when comparing China with the
actual performance of other countries, the proper benchmark is not "the record and performance of much wealthier countries" but rather that of "the
average country in its income class" (p. 11). This is because "[p]erformance
on human rights standards, including measures of civil and political fights,
and other indicia of human well-being, is highly correlated with wealth"-a

9.

For an overview of the commonly accepted theory of three generations of human rights,

see Bums H. Weston, Human Rights: Concept and Content, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD
COMMUNITY: ISSUES AND ACTION 17, 21-23 (Richard Pierre Claude & Bums H. Weston eds., 3d ed.

2006).
10.
P. 10. The World Bank puts China in the lower-middle-income class. The World Bank,
Country Groups, http://go.worldbank.org/D7SNOB8YUO (last visited Nov. 29, 2007) [hereinafter
The World Bank, Country Groups]. This class includes countries with a Gross National Income
("GNI") per capita between $906 and $3,595. The World Bank, Country Classification,
http://go.worldbank.org/K2CKM78CC0 (last visited Nov. 29, 2007). Other Asian countries in this
class include Indonesia, Iran, and the Philippines. The World Bank, Country Groups, supra.
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claim that Peerenboom convincingly establishes with empirical analysis."
Peerenboom concludes, "As countries become wealthier, they generally protect all rights better" (p. 40).
When examined in this new comparative context, China is a strong performer in its own income class in most areas of human rights, the rule of
law, and quality of governance. Peerenboom observes, "China's performance across a range of variables ... is on the whole demonstrably superior
to the performance of most African, Middle Eastern, and Latin American
countries with which it is often lumped as a problem case" (p. 20). China's
performance on economic rights is "particularly [impressive] in light of the
disappointing performance of so many other developing countries" (p. 19).
On most major indicators of human rights and well-being (except civil and
political rights), "China outperforms the average country in its income
class" (p. 20). China's quality of governance, as reflected in the World Bank
good-governance indicators, is superior to, or at least as good as, the average country in its income class, including many democracies (p. 184).
In addition to a country's income level, there is a second dimension in
Peerenboom's comparative context: cultural and regional influences. While
income level alone does not explain China's low score on civil and political
rights, cultural and regional influences help account for this anomaly. After
comparing the East Asian region with other countries on a variety of rights
indicators, Peerenboom concludes that "East Asian countries with a Confucian influence, even if democratic, tend to do poorly relative to income level
on civil and political rights" (p. 43). Countries such as Japan, Singapore, and
Vietnam "all underperform relative to income" (p. 43). China, where Confucianism originated and maintains a strong influence, is no exception. Viewed
in this cultural-regional comparative context, China's poor performance on
civil and political rights becomes more explainable, if not excusable.
C. Offender or Contender: The Competing Approaches

Peerenboom's generally positive assessment of China's human rights
performance in the comparative context and the prevailing criticism leveled
against China represent two competing approaches in measuring a country's
performance on human rights issues: one is what I will call the offender
11.
Pp. 39-40. There is, however, a minor flaw in Peerenboom's statistical analysis showing
the positive correlation between wealth and social and economic fights as measured by the Human
Development Index (HDI). Pp. 39-40, 129-30. The HDI is a composite index constructed from the
average of three indices: life expectancy index, education index, and GDP per capita index. See
UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006, at 393-94 (2006).
Because GDP per capita is a component of HDI, the high correlation (r=.92) between HDI and
GDP per capita is a result of the presence of GDP per capita on both sides of the regression equation
and is likely an overestimate of the true value. It may therefore be more appropriate to exclude the
GDP component from HDI in computing the correlation. By my calculations, based on the same set
of UNDP data used by Peerenboom, the correlation between the life expectancy index and GDP per
capita is .76; the correlation between the education index and GDP per capita is .77. Both are
slightly lower than the correlation between HDI and GDP that Peerenboom derives (.92), though
they still reveal a strongly positive correlation between wealth and social and economic fights and
support his conclusion.
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model, used by the U.S. government and Western human rights activists; the
other is the contender model, embodied in Peerenboom's "broader comparative context"' 12 and advocated by China Modernizes.
The offender model compares a country's human rights performance
with a fixed set of rules to determine whether the rules have been violated.
This approach is analogous to the criminal justice system, which mandates a
common set of minimum standards of conduct for all members of society
and punishes those who fail to adhere to them. Many hallmarks of the domestic criminal justice system are also present in today's international
human rights regime: international human rights are often regarded as
"standards of conduct" for states with respect to their own citizens;' 3 states
that fall short of these standards will receive various "punishments," typically by way of an annual "name and shame" process in the United Nations
Human Rights Commission or, in limited circumstances, economic sanctions. 14
The contender model differs from the offender model in two significant
ways. First, it does not prescribe a fixed set of standards of conduct that all
must meet or be punished. Rather, it compares the performance of each participant against that of the others and rewards the superior performer.
Second, it recognizes that performance is often critically affected by the
characteristics of the contestants and accommodates this fact by grouping
and comparing contestants only with others of similar attributes. An analogy
for this approach is any kind of competitive sport in which contestants compete against others of similar age, gender, or weight and are rewarded for
superior performance. Peerenboom's "broader comparative context," under
which one assesses a country's human rights performance relative to that of
countries at similar income levels, falls squarely within the contender model.
The offender-contender framework is critical to a proper understanding
of Peerenboom's position and his arguments in China Modernizes. Without
appreciating Peerenboom's implicit argument that China is better treated as
a contender rather than an offender, a believer of the offender model will
likely find Peerenboom's "broader comparative context" argument utterly
unconvincing. Those who reject the contender model might ask why China's
human rights record should be explainable or even excusable by its status as
a low-income country or its cultural heritage. The analogy between the

12.

P. 10; see also supra Section I.B.

13.

See, e.g., Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights,

42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 201, 212 (2001) ("The European human rights system ... is designed to hold
member states to particular standards of conduct in their treatment of individuals.").
14. Of the two kinds of sanctions, public-shaming sanctions appear to be the more effective
tool, as governments will often go to great lengths to avoid a condemnatory conclusion in the Human Rights Commission. See Michael J. Dennis & David P. Stewart, Justiciability of Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights: Should There be an International Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate
the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health?, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 462, 511 (2004). For the inefficacy of economic sanctions, see, for example, Christopher Wall, Human Rights and Economic
Sanctions: The New hnperialism, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 577 (1998).
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offender model and the criminal justice system appears to support their
position: crime, like human rights violations, is also highly correlated with
the offender's income,'5 but in the criminal justice system, wealth, or the
lack thereof, is almost never an excuse for crime. 6 Just like the lack of any
other means of income is never an excuse for one to engage in theft,
robbery, or prostitution, a country's low-income status does not make human
rights violations against its own citizens any less reprehensible or
punishable. Similarly, an offender's cultural, regional, and political
background, under this view, should have little bearing on the determination
of its guilt or punishment because by definition, the minimum standards of
conduct, both in the criminal-justice context and in the international human
rights context, reflect universal values and must be observed by all members
17
of the community regardless of their personal beliefs or practices.
Therefore, if Peerenboom's argument is only read to mean that China's
human rights violations are no worse than many other low-income countries
or countries with similar cultural backgrounds, appeals to proponents of the
offender model are likely to fall on deaf ears.
Peerenboom's "broader comparative context" argument should be more
appropriately understood, first and foremost, as a challenge to the international human rights regime's overreliance on the offender model. By
criticizing the use of idealized accounts of human rights or the record of
wealthier countries as the universal benchmark for human rights protection,
Peerenboom questions whether the standards of conduct currently in use
under the offender model, supposedly minimal in theory, have been
stretched unrealistically broadly in practice. Using standard criminal law
terminology, this amounts to a challenge to overcriminalization in the realm
of international conduct regulation. This challenge to overcriminalization
forms the basis of both Peerenboom's argument that China's human rights
record is more properly assessed in comparison with countries at similar
income levels and his conclusion that China is a strong contender in its own
right when viewed in this "broader comparative context."
Thus the issue is not whether China is more properly examined in a
stand-alone context or compared to countries of similar income. Rather, the
debate is more properly understood as one between the offender model and
the contender model. Both models have normative appeal and the ideal approach to dealing with human rights issues should probably be a
combination of both. At one end of the spectrum lie certain violations of
core human rights, such as genocide and torture, that offend the basic hu15. See, e.g., Tomislav V. Kovandzic et al., The Structural Covariates of Urban Homicide:
Reassessing the Impact of Income Inequality and Poverty in the Post-Reagan Era, 36 CRIMINOLOGY
569, 570-77 (1998) (summarizing the wealth of theoretical and empirical literature on the correlation between crime and poverty and income inequality).
16. J. ANGELO CORLETT, RESPONSIBILITY
alone is no excuse, legally speaking, for crime.").

AND PUNISHMENT

24 (3d ed. 2006) ("[Ploverty

17. Cf. President's Remarks in Kyoto, Japan, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1724, 1729
(Nov. 16, 2005) ("In the 21st century, freedom is an Asian value because it is a universal value. It is
freedom that enables the citizens of Asia to live lives of dignity.").
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man dignity universally cherished by all nations and should be examined
under the offender model. Toward the other end of the spectrum, however,
are rights where performance is highly correlated with a country's wealth
and affected by its cultural heritage and political institutions.' Performance
in these areas of human rights should be examined under the contender
model, which compares nations of comparable abilities and rewards leaders
in each group instead of punishing or shaming those who fall behind.
In theory, it is easy to understand that at some point along the axis of
conduct regulation, the offender model stops being a justifiable tool to deter
violations and the contender model begins to be the preferred method to
encourage compliance. But in practice it is difficult to determine where the
stick should end and where the carrot should begin. The prevailing criticism
that portrays China as the worst offender of human rights presupposes a
broad definition of the core rights; it applies the offender model to almost all
rights ranging from civil and political rights to social and economic rights
and seeks to stigmatize those whose conduct falls short of "the normatively
inspiring yet frequently violated idealistic standards" (p. 10). Peerenboom,
on the other hand, would reject this approach and argue for a less inclusive
composition of the core rights, leaving many rights to be examined under
the contender model.
A detailed discussion of where the line should lie is beyond the scope of
this Notice, but it is helpful to briefly note that the standards of conduct used
under the offender model should be clearly established and universally
accepted in international law for it to have any meaningful application.' 9 Just
as criminal statutes should not penalize all conduct falling short of saintliness, the offender model cannot be applied to behavior falling short of some
mythical, always-compliant nation. Instead, jus cogens, or the limited set of
peremptory norms in international law such as the prohibition against genocide and torture, 20 may serve as a promising starting point for the rules of
conduct in the offender model. Because jus cogens is often viewed as "a
moral minimum that all communities must meet,"2' the analogy between jus
cogens and criminal statutes is readily apparent, 22 making an offender model
designed to punish violators of these very worst of crimes both legally and
morally justifiable. Alleged violations of rights less well-defined and more
18.

See supra Section I.B.

19. See George P. Smith, II, Human Rights and Bioethics: Formulatinga Universal Right to
Health, Health Care, or Health Protection?,38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1295, 1308 (2005) ("Seeking universality in application of human rights requires all states to respect a defined set or core of
minimum standards of behavior.").
20. Article 53 of the Vienna Convention defines jus cogens as "a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having
the same character." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
21,

Larry May, Crimes Against Humanity 32 (2005) (emphasis omitted).

22. Scholars have long studied the similarity and connection between the core norms in
international law and domestic law, beginning with H.L.A. Hart, who articulated the link between
minimal natural law principles and rudimentary rules governing human societies. Id. at 31-32.
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contested than jus cogens should properly be viewed under the contender
model, and factors such as the country's wealth and culture should be taken
into account.

13

II.

THE UNEVEN HAND OF THE WORLD POLICE

Having concluded that China's human rights record compares favorably
with many other low-income countries, Peerenboom next demonstrates the
double standard that the United States adopts in its role as the chief enforcer
of international human rights, examines several potential explanations for
employing a double standard against China, and calls for an end to this practice (Chapter Five).
Peerenboom first shows that China has been subject to considerably
more censure than many other countries with worse records across a range
of indicators (p. 165). The United States and other Western powers are often
quick to criticize China-initiating eleven attempts to censure China before
the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva since 1990-while turning a blind eye to the gross violations of human rights in countries such as
India and Saudi Arabia (pp. 163-64). In 2002, for example, China received a
score of four on the Political Terror Scale ("PTS") and was targeted for
criticism in Geneva for systematic human rights violations (p. 169). In the
same year, however, seven out of the eight countries with the worst PTS
rating of five were not censured, and only three other countries among the
twenty-two with the same PTS rating as China were similarly targeted
(pp. 169-70).
Those who are quick to brand Peerenboom as an apologist for dictators
might also dismiss his criticism of the United States' conduct as irrelevant to
the assessment of China's human rights record or argue that Peerenboom's
criticism proceeds upon the questionable assumption that enforcement of all
rules must be uniform. Based on the analogy between the offender model
and the criminal justice system, the skeptics may point to the fact that in the
domestic criminal justice system, selective enforcement is often tolerated
and sometimes even a necessary evil. Indeed, in the domestic legal system,
selective prosecution is never a valid "defense on the merits to the criminal
charge itself,"2 4 for good reasons, and rarely excuses a defendant except
when the prosecution is proven to be impermissibly discriminatory. 2 Likewise, one could argue that the failure to prosecute other offenders of human
23. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 19, at 1308 ("So long as [states] meet these [minimum core]
standards, adjustments might allow for differing legal, moral, and cultural value systems within each
state."); Wall, supra note 14, at 603--04 ("The United States could make strides in human rights
enforcement by keeping in mind that ...cultural constraints exist in places such as China, where
attempts to impose U.S. or Western norms in some cases amounts to an attempt to make apple pie
out of egg rolls.").
24.

United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463 (1996).

25. Id. at 463-64 (outlining the elements necessary to a selective-prosecution claim and
noting with approval that it is difficult to overcome the presumption that the prosecution was not
motivated by discrimination).
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rights does not make China's violations any less reprehensible and blameworthy, and selective enforcement may be legally defensible on a variety of
grounds including-as one scholar has suggested in the similar "selective
intervention" context-the limited resources available to law enforcement
that renders uniform enforcement practically impossible.26
Peerenboom rejects this "limited resources" justification for selective
enforcement. Although one potential justification for applying a double
standard to China is that improving the human rights situation in China, a
country with one-fifth of the world's population, produces the biggest bang
for the buck (p. 165), that justification fails to withstand Peerenboom's critical analysis. India has a population comparable to that of China and also has
a PTS score of four for its violations of physical-integrity rights (p. 166).
Moreover, India suffers from much more severe poverty than China, with
twice as many people living on less than one dollar per day (p. 165). India's
violations of human rights, including extrajudicial killing, torture, rape, and
arbitrary detention, also appear to be at least as serious as, if not more egregious than, those of China (p. 166-68). Nonetheless, the United States "never
once sponsored a motion to censure India for rights violations" between 1990
and 2004; nor has the U.S. State Department cited India as a country of political concern, despite its repeated condemnation of China for "egregious,
systematic ongoing abuses" (p. 168). Population size, as Peerenboom concludes, "may matter, but apparently not when it comes to even-handed
treatment of rights violations" (p. 169).
Peerenboom instead suggests that the uneven hand of the world police is
more likely due to the longstanding bias of the international human rights
regime against non-liberal democracies (p. 169), a bias that bears a dangerous resemblance to discriminatory prosecution in the domestic realm and
runs directly counter to Justice Jackson's famous admonishment against
using the law to selectively embarrass individuals disliked or deemed unpopular by those wielding prosecutorial power.21 Indeed, all UN motions to
censure countries for systematic human rights violations in 2002 were
against nondemocracies, even though many democracies or semidemocracies had worse or equally poor records with respect to personal-integrity
violations (p. 170).
Whatever the true reason may be, selective enforcement without sufficient justification, especially if systematically biased against certain groups,
seriously undermines the legitimacy of the offender model as it is currently
implemented. Just as selective enforcement of criminal statutes may "tip[]
the scales of justice so far over that it ...seriously undermine[s] the credi-

26. See Lea Brilmayer, What's the Matter with Selective Intervention?, 37 ARIZ. L. REv.
955, 967 (1995) (analogizing the United States' selective intervention in the international context to
domestic law enforcement and recognizing that law enforcement often must be prioritized to "get
the most 'bang' for one's law enforcement 'buck' ").
27. Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y 18, 19 (1940)
("[A] prosecutor [must not] pick[] some person whom he dislikes or desires to embarrass, or select[]
some group of unpopular persons and then look[] for an offense ....).
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bility of the justice system as a whole, 28 selectively censuring countries for
human rights issues can have similarly counterproductive effects. "[T]he
evident hypocrisy of picking and choosing the point at which to raise the
issue of human rights" will likely backfire because "[w]hen norms are inconsistently followed, they simply lose their character as norms, 29 Going
after certain countries for human rights violations while tolerating similar or
even more egregious conduct elsewhere, without a principled justification
for such selective behavior, will also undermine U.S. credibility in its role as
the chief advocate and enforcer of the international human rights regime. 3°
The risks of unprincipled selective enforcement of the offender model
have materialized in China's reaction to American-led name-and-shame
sanctions. The Chinese government, repeatedly and specially targeted with
shaming punishments for its alleged human rights violations, "is often quick
to assume a defensive posture, stonewalling or defending its record at
length... rather than exploring constructive ways to improve the current
situation" (p. 164). Chinese citizens likewise became increasingly suspicious of the motives of NGOs and highly critical of the U.S. government (p.
165). As support among Chinese citizens for international reform efforts
weakens (p. 164), nationalist sentiments grow stronger than ever, based not
just on the pride in the Chinese culture but also on feelings of resentment
toward the United States, making it even less likely for a peaceful and cooperative relationship to exist between those powers (p. 165). Given these
counterproductive consequences of selective enforcement, Peerenboom calls
for an end to the "double standard" that the U.S. government employs towards China (p. 183).
Examined under the offender-contender framework, however, China
Modernizes could have gone one step further: the root cause of selective
enforcement is more than just the United States' subjective willingness to
turn a blind eye to the behavior of other countries; rather, it may be that the
overly inclusive core standards of conduct in the current offender model
provide the United States ample opportunity to pick and choose from a wide
range of targets. The bidirectional causal link between overcriminalization
and selective enforcement is extensively discussed and well understood in
the domestic legal realm. As criminal law expands to regulate an everincreasing range of conduct, prosecutorial resources will be strained and
selective prosecution becomes inevitable; 3' and when the executive branch is
entrusted with prosecutorial discretion, legislatures tend to enact more

28.

Lis Wiehl, "Sounding Black" in the Courtroom: Court-Sanctioned Racial Stereotyping,

18 HARV. BLACKLETTERL.J. 185, 207 (2002).
29.
(1991).
30.

Lea Brilmayer, The Odd Advantage of Reliable Enemies, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 331, 338
See Wall, supra note 14, at 603.

See Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& Soc. Sci. 157, 168 (1967).
31.
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broadly sweeping criminal statutes. 2 In today's international human rights
regime, which is largely based on an expansive offender model, it is therefore unsurprising that overcriminalization (the use of a broad set of core
standards of conduct) and selective enforcement are mutually reinforcing.
As a result, targeting selective enforcement alone may not be effective: the
international human rights regime must also refrain from zealously applying
the offender model to criminalize an overbroad range of conduct and should
instead adopt the contender model when evaluating a country's performance
outside the minimum core rights.
CONCLUSION

Between China and the United States, the focus of the debate has been,
and likely will continue to be, different and often incompatible interpretations of human rights. "[W]ith all the fervor of a religious zealot," the
United States, especially the current administration (pp. 178-79), has taken
the stance that China needs to conform to the U.S. vision of human rights,
rule of law, and democracy,33 but China, echoing Confucius's principle of
"harmony, but not conformity," from two millennia ago, 34 may be more inclined to insist on its own interpretation of human rights and to follow its
own agenda on institutional reforms. For those of us caught in between,
China Modernizes offers a refreshing look at the two sides of the controversy behind the rhetoric. At its core, the debate presents the question of
choosing a proper balance between two competing approaches to enforcing
the international human rights regime: the offender model, which the United
States would apply, along with the broad set of rules of conduct it prescribes; and the contender model, which China and much of the less wealthy
developing world would undoubtedly prefer.

32. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L.
505, 547 (2001).

REV.

33. On the origin, development, and failure of this "benevolent hegemony" strategy, see
Francis Fukuyama, After Neoconservatism, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 19, 2006, § 6 (Magazine), at 62.
34. See THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS § 13.23) (Simon Leys trans., W.W. Norton & Company 1997) ("The Master said: 'A gentleman seeks harmony, but not conformity. A vulgar man
seeks conformity, but not harmony.' ").
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